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FIFTY YEARS ON: THE CURIOUS CASE OF INTERSECTIONAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE 
ICCPR 
 
Shreya Atrey* 
 
Abstract  
2016 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the ICCPR and thus of the oldest self-standing 
general right to non-discrimination in international law under article 26. The Human 
Rights Committee has enforced the right with rigour creating a vast and formidable 
body of discrimination jurisprudence over the decades. This jurisprudence, though, is 
doggedly single-dimensional and appears to have given a short shrift to discrimination 
based on multiple and intersecting grounds of article 26, viz. race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status. This article examines the curious case of missing intersectional 
discrimination in the ICCPR. It does so by pulling together the dispersed and often 
unidentified claims based on more than one ground of discrimination. It delineates the 
pathologies of reasoning in these claims which have overlooked the idea of 
‘intersectionality’ understood as disadvantage based on multiple and intersecting 
grounds, which is both similar to and different from disadvantage based on individual 
grounds. The article shows that this conceptual reckoning matters in identifying and 
addressing discrimination, and thus enforcing the commitment in article 26 of 
addressing not just single-ground discrimination but ‘any discrimination’ against ‘all 
persons’ on ‘any ground…or other status.’ 
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1. Introduction 
 
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) has emerged the 
oldest and largest body of discrimination jurisprudence in international law.1 On 23 
March 1976, the ICCPR was the first core human rights treaty to come into force, and 
article 26 of the ICCPR became the first freestanding general right to non-
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1  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171.  
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discrimination which now binds 168 States Parties.2 Article 26 prohibits discrimination 
in all spheres, not only in relation to the rights guaranteed under the ICCPR.3 Unlike 
single-ground treaties like the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), 4  the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),5 and the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD),6 it applies to a non-exhaustive list of grounds including eleven 
enumerated grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, and birth.7 The Human Rights Committee (HRC or 
the Committee), established under Part IV of the ICCPR and mandated by the First 
Optional Protocol,8 decided its first individual communication on the violation of 
article 26 as early as 9 April 1981.9  It has since decided over 120 individual 
communications on merits under article 26 alone, single-handedly more than the 
entire body of jurisprudence of the CEDAW, CERD and CRPD Committees. Even the 
first ICCPR General Comment on non-discrimination and equality between sexes dates 
back to 30 July 1981, several months before the specific treaty on the subject – 
CEDAW – came into force.10 The quality of the ICCPR discrimination jurisprudence too 
has been widely acclaimed as ‘rich and dynamic’11 and has, in substantive terms, 
yielded outstanding successes like extending the right to non-discrimination under 
article 26 to the realm of economic, social, and cultural rights; 12  including 
homosexuality13 and nationality14 as ‘other statuses’ in the list of prohibited grounds; 
extending the States’ responsibility towards prohibiting private acts of 
                                                 
2  The list of State Parties to the ICCPR, as of 20 November 2016, is available at 
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&clang=_en> accessed 20 August 2016. 
3 Cf ICCPR, art 2(1), which applies only in relation to the rights guaranteed under the ICCPR and arts 
23–25 which guarantee non-discrimination in relation to particular rights.   
4  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) (adopted 
7 March 1966, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 196.  
5  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (adopted 18 
December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13.  
6  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) (adopted 13 December 2006, entered 
into force 3 May 2008) 2515 UNTS 3.  
7  Cf ICCPR, art 3, which specifically relates to equality between men and women.  
8  Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. The Optional Protocol binds 115 State 
Parties. <https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
5&chapter=4&clang=_en> accessed 20 August 2016.  
9  Aumeeruddy-Cziffra et al v Mauritius (1981) CCPR/C/12/D/35/1978.  
10  HRC, ‘General Comment No 18: Non-Discrimination’ (1989) HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol I).  
11  ‘The Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination’, Icelandic Human Rights Centre, 
<http://www.humanrights.is/en/human-rights-education-project/human-rights-concepts-ideas-
and-fora/substantive-human-rights/the-right-to-equality-and-non-discrimination> accessed 20 
August 2016. 
12  Broeks v the Netherlands (1987) CCPR/C/OP/2/1984; Zwaan-de-Vries v the Netherlands (1987) 
CCPR/C/OP/2/209/1984.  
13  Toonen v Australia (1994) CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992. 
14  Gueye v France (1989) CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985.  
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discrimination;15  and upholding affirmative action as part of the right to non-
discrimination.16 In fact, as Joseph and Castan remark: ‘[s]ome of the most rigorous 
Optional Protocol decisions have concerned article 26,’17 within the vast swath of 
ICCPR jurisprudence which is itself considered the ‘lion’s share of UN jurisprudence.’18 
Non-discrimination and equality has thus emerged as ‘the single dominant theme of 
the Covenant’19 that shines through its formidable legacy of fifty years.  
 
On this impressive canvas appears an incredulous dent. The ICCPR jurisprudence 
remains largely ignorant of discrimination based on a combination of grounds. Neither 
does the text of article 26 nor does the more substantive statement on discrimination 
in General Comment No 18, mention anything explicitly about discrimination based on 
multiple grounds considered together. References to dual, multiple, combination, 
overlapping, compound or intersectional discrimination remain scarce in the 
Committee’s decisions on individual communications.20 The result being, that the vast 
discrimination jurisprudence produced under the First Optional Protocol of the ICCPR 
from 1981-2016, is characteristically unidimensional in its focus: concerning 
discrimination when it occurs only on the basis of one of the grounds of race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status. In other words, it has turned a blind eye to ‘intersectionality’ or 
inequalities which occur not only on the basis of a single ground but on the basis of 
two or more intersecting grounds, for example, in case of unmarried female cohabiting 
partners – who have been one of the most persistent claimants before the HRC – on 
grounds of both marital status and gender.21 This came to be corrected, at least in 
relation to women, in General Comment No 28 on article 3 (which relates to equality 
between sexes) where the Committee recognised that discrimination against women is 
often ‘intertwined with discrimination on other grounds.’22 This was the first mention 
of the idea of intersectionality in the Committee’s discrimination jurisprudence. The 
second and the only other instance is the Committee’s 2011 decision in LNP v 
Argentina where it agreed with the author’s account of intersectional discrimination 
based on both sex and ethnicity.23 LNP also marks the end of its engagement with 
                                                 
15  Love et al v Australia (2003) CCPR/C/77/D/983/2001.  
16  Ballantyne v Canada (1993) CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989.   
17  Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, 
Commentary and Materials (OUP 2014) [1.72].  
18  ibid [1.12]. 
19  ibid [23.01] 
20  Wouter Vandenhole, Non-discrimination and Equality in the View of the UN Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies (Intersentia 2005) [36]. The jurisprudential analysis in this article is restricted to decisions 
under the individual communications procedure and does not span the state reporting mechanism.  
21  See nn 69-72 and accompanying text.  
22  HRC, ‘General Comment No 28: Equality of Rights between Men and Women (art. 3)’ (2000) 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 [30]. 
23  LNP v Argentina (2011) CCPR/C/102/D/1610/2007. 
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intersectional discrimination under the individual complaints procedure which 
continues to decide discrimination claims devoid of intersectionality.  
 
The result is puzzling because at least initially, this was not meant to be the case. Even 
before the term ‘intersectionality’ was coined in 1989, the first individual 
communication decided on article 26 in 1981 was specifically advanced as an 
intersectional claim based on multiple grounds. In Aumeeruddy-Cziffra, the authors 
claimed to be victims of discrimination not only on the basis of their sex but also on 
the basis of race and political opinion when their foreign husbands were denied 
residency by the Mauritian State.24 Seminal claims of discrimination in relation to 
socio-economic rights, like Vos (Hendrika S) v the Netherlands25 and Broeks too were 
explicitly argued on dual grounds of ‘sex and marital status’ and ‘sex and status’ 
respectively. The Committee paid scant attention to the significance of the interaction 
between multiple grounds in these communications despite of the fact that they were 
actually advanced as such. On the other hand, in claims where intersectionality 
potentially mattered, the fact that they were not actually argued in this way made the 
single-ground approach appear rather justified.26  
 
So despite the considerable and credible ICCPR discrimination jurisprudence, 
intersectionality remains wanting from the record. This article is dedicated to examine 
this anomaly in the particular context of the First Optional Protocol. It surveys the vast 
array of individual communications decided under the Optional Protocol concerning 
article 26 and picks through the lines of reasoning adopted in actual and potential 
claims of intersectional discrimination. The purpose is to learn how intersectionality 
remains underappreciated and importantly, why it matters to subject multi-grounds 
claims to an intersectional analysis. Section 2 identifies the kernel of intersectionality 
and intersectional discrimination and sets the perspective for the forthcoming 
discussion. Section 3 takes stock of article 26 claims which were either argued on 
multiple grounds or could have been, based on what is apparent in the Committee’s 
analyses of these claims. It establishes the curious case of the short shrift given to 
intersectionality implicated in multi-ground discrimination claims. In Section 4 an 
explanation follows for why it is important to understand and address intersectionality 
and intersectional discrimination under article 26. The central argument is that it 
matters in an instrumental way in addressing discrimination claims such that they 
succeed in identifying and responding to complex patterns of group disadvantage, and 
thus enforcing article 26 under international law per se. In the final analysis, the article 
shows the pathologies of reasoning which have contributed to an intersectionality-
devoid discrimination jurisprudence and in turn, supplies a normative grounding for 
                                                 
24  Aumeeruddy-Cziffra (n 9).  
25  Vos (Hendrika S) v the Netherlands (1989) CCPR/C/35/D/218/198.  
26  See discussion in Section 3.2 below.  
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altering this course by explaining the nature of intersectional discrimination, and 
pressing on the importance of addressing it as such under the ICCPR.  
 
2. The Idea of Intersectionality  
 
The vast and rich intellectual discourse on intersectionality can be traced back to over 
150 years of Black feminist thought.27 Its roots are firmly grounded in the Black 
feminist challenge to the normative conception of women as white and Blacks as male 
within the feminist and the civil rights movements. In defining groups and the 
disadvantage associated with them along a single-axis of sexism or racism alone, 
feminism and civil rights movement had erased Black women and their disadvantage 
from their progressive agendas. Black feminists thus decried the essentialist categories 
of women and Blacks which marginalised Black women who were afflicted not only by 
gender or race alone but by both of them at the same time. With this, Black feminism 
and intersectionality developed as a way to comprehend identity politics and the 
disadvantage associated with identities as complex and multi-faced—that is, resulting 
from the interaction of many coexisting and co-constituted disabling forces of sexism, 
racism, ableism, ageism, classism, heterosexuality, homophobia, transphobia, 
xenophobia, etc. Thus, the discourse contributed to an understanding of disadvantage 
or discrimination as defined not only by multiple and intersecting group-identities but 
by crosscutting ‘systems of subordination’28 or ‘matrix of domination’29 or ‘politic of 
domination’.30 This discourse expanded to categories, contexts and disciplines far 
beyond those of race and gender, the United States, and Black feminism. 31 
Intersectionality travelled across continents, informing both theory and praxis in South 
America, Africa and Asia; categories, like Muslim women, Black LGBTQ and disabled 
Romas; and disciplines, including psychology, history, sociology, anthropology, political 
science, and political theory. 32  In the course of its development, the idea of 
intersectionality thus turned into ‘a burgeoning field of intersectional studies’ of its 
own.33 
                                                 
27  Ange-Marie Hancock, Intersectionality: An Intellectual History (OUP 2016). 
28  Kimberlé W Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
against Women of Color’ (1991) 43 Stanford Law Review 1241.  
29  Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought (2nd edn, Routledge 2009) 21.  
30  bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin To Center (2nd edn, South End Press 2000) ch 2. 
31  See for a discussion of intersectionality as ‘travelling’ theory: Helma Lutz, Maria Teresa Herrera 
Vivar, and Linda Supik (eds), Framing Intersectionality: Debates on a Multi-Faceted Concept in 
Gender Studies (Ashgate 2011). 
32  R Aída Hernández Castillo, ‘The Emergence of Indigenous Feminism in Latin America’ (2010) 35 
Signs 539; Patricia Monture-Angus, Thunder in My Soul: A Mohawk Woman Speaks  (Fernwood 
1995); Elvia R Arriola, ‘Gendered Inequality: Lesbians, Gays and Feminist Legal Theory’ (1994) 9 
Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 103; Mary Eaton, ‘At the Intersection of Gender and Sexual 
Orientation: Towards a Lesbian Jurisprudence’ (1994) 3 Southern California Review of Law and 
Women’s Studies 183. 
33  Sumi Cho, Kimberlé W Crenshaw and Leslie McCall, ‘Toward a Field of Intersectionality Studies: 
Theory, Applications, and Praxis’ (2013) 38 Signs 785. 
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It is useful to remember then, that the term ‘intersectionality’ was introduced by 
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw in her seminal article in 1989,34 in the immediate context 
of the failure of Black women’s discrimination claims in the US.35 For example, in the 
locus classicus of DeGraffenreid, the claimants had challenged the ‘last hired first fired’ 
policy of General Motors as being discriminatory against Black women, on the basis of 
both race and sex. The District Court of Missouri declared that the ‘lawsuit must be 
examined to see if it states a cause of action for race discrimination, sex 
discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of both.’36 This the 
claimants failed to show. Their claim was neither of race and sex discrimination 
separately nor in the alternative but actually a combination of both. What they meant 
to show was that whilst neither Black men nor white women were fired because of 
their longer employment histories, the neutral policy specifically affected Black women 
because they entered employment last. But according to the Court, no such cause of 
action was available to Black women at all. In fact, to allow such a claim would have 
been to accredit a ‘new special sub-category’ or a ‘special class’ of Black women for 
the grant of a ‘new “super-remedy”’ beyond the contours of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act 1964 which prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, colour, religion, sex or 
national origin.37 
 
Crenshaw described this as the dominant conception of discrimination which 
protected only those disadvantaged on the basis of a single ground (say sex) and 
privileged in every other way (race, class, disability, sexual orientation, age, marital 
status etc.).38 This dominant conception was deficient in that it excluded claimants like 
Black women, for whom discrimination is defined by the intersection of at least two 
grounds, race and sex. She explained thus: 
 
Black women can experience discrimination in ways that are both similar to and 
different from those experienced by white women and Black men. Black 
women sometimes experience discrimination in ways similar to white women’s 
experiences; sometimes they share very similar experiences with Black 
men…And sometimes they experience discrimination as Black women… 39 
 
                                                 
34   Kimberlé W Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique 
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’ (1989) University of Chicago 
Legal Forum 139. 
35  DeGraffenreid v General Motors 413 F Supp 142 (ED Mo 1976); Payne v Trevanol 673 F 2d 798 (5th 
Cir 1982); Moore v Hughes 708 F 2d 475 (9th Cir 1983).  
36  DeGraffenreid, ibid 143.  
37  ibid. 
38  Crenshaw (n 34) 151.  
39  ibid 149.  
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Herein lay the centrepiece of intersectionality theory described by Crenshaw: that the 
distinct nature of discrimination based on two or more grounds is both similar to and 
different from discrimination based on the grounds individually.40 For example, the 
disadvantage suffered by poor Black women on the basis of their sex, race, and class—
is similar to the disadvantage suffered by white women (on the ground of sex), Black 
men (on the ground of race) and poor people (on the ground of class), and also similar 
to the disadvantage suffered by the groups of poor white women (on the grounds of 
sex and class), poor Black men (on the grounds of race and class), as well as Black 
women who are not poor (on the grounds of race and sex). But they also suffer 
disadvantage which is different from all of them and thus unique to poor Black women 
as poor Black women (on the grounds of race, sex and class together). The particular 
nature of their disadvantage understood in terms of this complex dynamic of 
sameness and difference in patterns of group disadvantage defines the idea of 
intersectionality. 
 
The category of intersectional discrimination reflects this idea of intersectionality for 
claims based on two or more grounds of discrimination considered together. It 
modifies the framework of single-ground discrimination—by first, including multiple 
grounds in a discrimination claim; and secondly, explaining the distinct nature of the 
resulting discrimination based on those grounds as similar to and different from that 
based on individual grounds. Thus, it provides a counter to the ‘dominant ways of 
thinking about discrimination,’41 by accepting that discrimination can be based on 
more than one ground, and by appreciating what it means when it does, i.e. produces 
similar and different patterns of group disadvantage when multiple grounds intersect. 
In this way, intersectionality transforms the causal basis of discrimination as 
understood to be linked to a single ground alone, to one which is based on multiple 
grounds simultaneously. 
 
Whilst the idea of intersectionality has been both keenly supported42 and critiqued,43 
its dissemination in international law as a category of discrimination itself has been 
slow.44 Just as in 1989, the dominant structure of discrimination continues to be based 
                                                 
40  Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall (n 33). 
41  Crenshaw (n 34) 150.  
42  Angela P Harris, ‘Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory’ (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 
581; Trina Grillo, ‘Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master’s House’ 
(1995) 10 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 16; Darren Hutchinson, ‘Identity Crisis: 
“Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of 
Subordination’ (2001) Michigan Journal of Race and Law 285.  
43  Joanne Conaghan, ‘Intersectionality and the Feminist Project in Law’ in Grabham et al (eds), 
Intersectionality and Beyond: Law, Power and the Politics of Location (Routledge-Cavendish 2009); 
Robert S Chang and Jerome McCristal Culp Jr, ‘After Intersectionality’ (2002) 71 UMKC Law Review 
485.  
44  Johanna Bond, ‘International Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic Exploration of 
Women's International Human Rights Violations’ (2003) 52 Emory Law Journal 71.  
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on a single ground, with piecemeal attention to the connection between patterns of 
group disadvantage.45 Commentators have continued to point out the gap between 
the vast developments in theory and its near absent implementation in international 
human rights practice.46 Taking cue from this tipped balance, this article does not 
rehash the commendable strides made in intersectionality theory but takes a hard look 
at the international law practice of discrimination under the First Optional Protocol of 
the ICCPR to understand and address the ways in which intersectionality fails to 
materialise. It is specifically concerned with examining how the basic idea of 
intersectionality transpires within the realm of article 26 on the right to non-
discrimination, and contributes to translating intersectionality into a legal category of 
discrimination under international law.  
 
3. The Curious Case  
 
To date, the HRC has decided over 120 individual communications on merits 
concerning article 26.47 Almost a hundred of them are either based on no particular 
ground (hence invoking the general guarantee of equality as reasonableness or equal 
treatment) or a single ground if at all, and there is little on record in these 
communications to pull up on intersectionality. Statistically speaking then, these 
communications have occupied much of the HRC’s attention. But almost a 
considerable sixth of its jurisprudence resonates with intersectionality in either of the 
two ways—that the claim was explicitly argued on multiple grounds; or even if it were 
not, the problem at hand was clearly an intersectional one creating indistinguishable 
patterns of group disadvantage based on multiple grounds, as apparent from the 
Committee’s analysis. In neither case has the HRC’s own response been 
intersectionality-friendly, other than the lone example of LNP. A systematic 
exploration of the reasoning in these decisions reveals how intersectionality has been 
missed and the nature of loss that results. Section 4 complements the forthcoming 
doctrinal analysis by drawing together the apparent structural hurdles for recognising 
intersectionality, and the significance of including it in the Committee’s repertoire of 
discrimination analysis. The central argument is that it matters for the Committee to 
treat actual or potential intersectional claims as claims of intersectional discrimination 
to understand and address the diagnostic link in article 26 between a breach and its 
basis in certain grounds of discrimination which creates intersectional patterns of 
group disadvantage. 
 
                                                 
45  Aisha Nicole Davis, ‘Intersectionality and International Law: Recognizing Complex Identities at the 
Global Stage’ (2015) 28 Harvard Human Rights Journal 205. 
46  Pok Yin S Chow, ‘Has Intersectionality Reached its Limits? Intersectionality in the UN Human Rights 
Treaty Body Practice and the Issue of Ambivalence’ (2016) 16 Human Rights Law Review 453. 
47  The numerical figure relates to cases which were specifically decided on article 26 either alone or 
in conjunction with violation of other rights.  
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3.1 Multi-ground claims of intersectional discrimination  
 
Claims which were explicitly advanced by the authors on two or more grounds of 
discrimination can be delineated into two sets: first, those which were argued but not 
decided on multiple grounds; and secondly, the individual communication in LNP 
which was argued and decided on multiple grounds as an intersectional claim. The 
distinction between the two approaches will become clear in the following analysis.  
 
In the first instance emerge claims which were explicitly advanced on multiple grounds 
understood in an intersectional way but ultimately decided on a single ground alone. 
Five examples mark this theme. The first ever article 26 decision adopted by the 
Committee in 1981, signifies the initial possibility of advancing a claim in all its 
complexity without being limited to a single ground.48 The authors in Aumeeruddy-
Cziffra argued that the restriction on their foreign husbands to obtain residency in 
Mauritius was discriminatory not only on the basis of sex but also on the basis of race 
or political opinion.49 While the State decided to justify the unequal status of the 
spouses of Mauritian citizens on the basis of race,50 the authors explained that their 
discrimination claim was not so much about their spouses’ race, as it was about the 
authors themselves as married women to not have their choices curtailed because of 
their partner’s race or political opinion, or to have the partners deported or denied 
residence because of that choice.51 Despite this explanation which earmarked several 
grounds including sex, marital status, race and political opinion as identifiers of 
discrimination, the Committee addressed the complaint as a matter of sex 
discrimination alone.52 Whilst it found both the violation of article 23 (the right to 
marry) as well as article 26 as a matter of sex discrimination, an exploration of the 
claimant’s case of specific disadvantage suffered by and as women married to foreign 
husbands remained unexplored in the Committee’s analysis. Even though the claim 
succeeded, the Committee let pass the possibility to substantiate on the intersectional 
claim of similar and different patterns of disadvantage which accrued not just because 
the authors were women but particularly the disadvantages suffered by women in 
marriage, especially their choice of husbands and the impact of controlling that choice 
based on nationality or race.  
 
This single-ground approach established in the debutant decision has been followed 
and cemented since. But early communications, just as Aumeeruddy-Cziffra, continued 
to try their luck by arguing intersectional claims on multiple grounds even when the 
Committee’s response was bluntly unidimensional each time. Four claims against the 
                                                 
48  Aumeeruddy-Cziffra (n 9). 
49  ibid [6.1]. 
50  ibid [5.2].  
51 ibid [6.2].  
52  ibid [9.2 (b) 2 (ii) 2].  
  10 
Netherlands in relation to married women’s social benefits symbolise the initial 
resistance of the authors towards collapsing complex claims, which aptly belonged to 
the intersection of sex, marital status, and socio-economic status or class, to simply 
one of those. Landmark decisions in Broeks and Zwaan-de Vries, decided on the same 
day in 1984, were both specifically argued on the grounds of ‘sex and status’ and ‘sex 
and marital status’ respectively – a point seldom noted about them. Both challenged 
the ‘breadwinner’ assumption in Dutch law which precluded married women from 
unemployment benefits because only men were supposed to be employed 
(‘breadwinners’) and hence eligible for unemployment benefits. Whilst both the claims 
succeeded— and rightly so— by extending the application of article 26 to socio-
economic rights beyond the scope of the ICCPR,53 the Committee reached a favourable 
outcome by essentially bypassing the claim of intersectional discrimination. It reduced 
the claimant’s assertion of sex, and social and marital status to simply sex 
discrimination in both. In Zwaan-de Vries, as the record indicated: ‘[t]he author 
claim[ed] that the only reasons she was denied unemployment benefits are her sex 
and marital status and contend[ed] that this constitutes discrimination within the 
scope of article 26 of the Covenant.’54 Despite this assertion, the Committee found 
that the impugned law violated article 26 because the author was ‘denied a social 
security benefit on an equal footing with men.’55 Although true, this represents only a 
half-truth in the circumstances of the claim. Not all women were denied an equal 
footing with men—it was specifically married women in need of social benefits 
because of their economic condition who were affected. Although they shared their 
material disadvantage with other single women and those dependent on social 
benefits, they suffered some unique disadvantages, like those which flowed from the 
impugned provision which specifically deprived them of benefits because of their 
intersectional status. In Broeks, the situation was further complicated by the fact that 
the author was disabled and was dismissed from her job, which is why she sought 
unemployment benefits. The exacerbation of the author’s disadvantage because of her 
disability featured nowhere on record. The author however framed her claim as a 
matter of sex and marital status discrimination and explained that: 
 
 if she were a man, married or unmarried, the law in question would not 
deprive her of unemployment benefits. Because she is a woman, and was 
married at the time in question, the law excludes her from continued 
unemployment benefits. This, she claims, makes her a victim of a violation of 
article 26 of the Covenant on the grounds of sex and [marital] status.56 
 
                                                 
53  Zwaan (n 12) [12.1].  
54  ibid [2.2].  
55  ibid [15]. 
56  Broeks (n 12) [2.3]. 
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The Committee responded by reducing the claim to a single ground of sex by 
proclaiming that: ‘a differentiation which appears on one level to be one of [marital] 
status is in fact one of sex, placing married women at a disadvantage compared with 
married men.’57 The comparison was under-inclusive in that it was not just married 
men to whom the ‘breadwinner’ assumption did not apply but all men and even 
unmarried women who did not have such a condition imposed in order to access 
unemployment benefits. In focussing on the ‘breadwinner’ assumption out of context, 
the Committee divorced the claim from implications of marriage upon women and 
their economic dependence on male spouses. As the forthcoming analysis shows, the 
failure to address the structural disadvantages faced by women in marriage continued 
in the numerous claims brought against the Netherlands, perhaps due to the 
piecemeal and abstract treatment of such claims which failed to address 
intersectionality each time.  
 
The importance of reckoning with the causal basis of intersectionality – which reveals 
similar and different patterns of group disadvantage based on multiple grounds – can 
be particularly appreciated in communications which eventually failed in the absence 
of it. Vos (Hendrika S) represents an apt example of this. It involved a challenge to the 
legislative provision which disentitled disabled women of benefits under the General 
Disablement Benefits Act upon the death of their husbands and instead they got a 
lower level of pension under the General Widows and Orphans Act. The Committee 
rejected the author’s argument that this constituted discrimination under article 26 
based on ‘sex and marital status.’58 It was instead persuaded by the State’s bipartite 
explanation that: (i) the General Widows and Orphans Act provided the disabled 
widows with benefits anyway and since disabled widowers were not entitled to claim 
benefits under it, there could not be any sex discrimination;59 (ii) in any case, even if 
the level of benefits under the General Widows and Orphans Act was lower, the 
exclusion from the General Disablement Benefits Act (even if higher) was justified 
because it was merely a result of ‘the application of a uniform rule to avoid 
overlapping in the allocation of social security benefits.’60 Given that the purpose of 
both the legislations was beneficial in nature (ensuring benefits to all persons falling 
under subsistence level income), the impugned distinction was ultimately found to be 
‘objective and reasonable’.61  
 
The problem with this reasoning is plain. The claim under article 26 is first seen as a 
simple case of sex discrimination, divorced from other relevant grounds of marital 
status, disability and reliance on social benefits. It is then defeated by a simplistic logic 
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59  ibid [9.1].  
60  ibid [12]. 
61  ibid. 
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which points to the equal exclusion of widowers from the lower rate of benefits under 
the General Widows and Orphans Act rather than tackling the argument about 
exclusion of disabled widows from the higher rate of benefits under the General 
Disablement Benefits Act—only the latter being the subject of discrimination being 
complained of. The claim was neither about distinction between disabled widows and 
disabled widowers nor about the distinction between disabled and non-disabled 
widows, but rather, as the dissenting opinion of Messrs Francisco Aguilar Urbina and 
Bertil Wennergren describes, concerned ‘an indeterminate group of persons who fall 
in the category of disabled women entitled to full disability pensions.’62 This group was 
denied their full disability benefits upon being widowed. The actual group and their 
disadvantage were thus defined not just by sex, disability, marital status, or reliance on 
social benefits but all of them at the same time. The intersectional discrimination was 
a result of the denial of full disability benefits to the author because she was now a 
widow.63 The dissenting opinion thus found a violation of article 26 by appreciating 
this specific disadvantage suffered by the authors in light of: (i) the higher level of 
pension for disabled women because of their ‘physical needs as disabled persons;’64 (ii) 
the failure to make an exception for disabled widows was a failure to treat them on 
par with other disabled women getting full disability benefits; 65  and (iii) the 
deprivation of full disability benefits to widows as lacking an objective basis.66 The brief 
but solid foundations of the dissenters’ reasoning touched upon all grounds of sex, 
marital status, disability and need for benefits without privileging one or the other as 
the sole basis or ground of the challenge.  
 
In the second instance – and in contrast with the continued diffidence towards 
intersectionality – appears the decision in LNP which was not only argued on multiple 
grounds but also responded to with a formidable intersectional analysis. The author 
complained of discrimination on the basis of sex and ethnicity in the handling of her 
rape complaint by the police and judicial system in Argentina. She substantiated her 
claim with specific instances which showed how she was targeted as a minor 
indigenous girl. These instances included: inordinate delay in responding to her 
complaint; lapses in investigation and unfair trial of her case as compared to rapes 
reported by women of the dominant community; the re-victimisation of the author by 
perpetrating negative stereotypes about her character and morals during the trial; and 
the use of Spanish throughout the process despite the protests of the author and her 
family that they did not understand Spanish as indigenous people. The author further 
                                                 
62  ibid (Appendix) [4]. 
63  See also Cavalcanti Araujo-Jongen v the Netherlands (1993) CCPR/C/49/D/418/1990, which was 
argued on the basis of ‘sex in relation to (marital) status’. ibid [5]. 
64  Vos (Hendrika S) (Appendix) (n 25) [3]. 
65  ibid [4]. 
66  ibid [5]. 
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elaborated the systemic nature of disadvantage suffered by indigenous women such 
that: 
 
 her case is by no means exceptional, since Qom girls and women are frequently 
exposed to sexual assault in the area, while the pattern of impunity that exists 
in regard to such cases is promoted by the prevalence of racist attitudes. The 
author adds that, in the opposite case, when a Creole woman says that she has 
been raped by a Qom, he is immediately arrested and sentenced.67 
 
The Committee agreed with all of the author’s arguments and in the absence of any 
contestation by the State declared that the facts revealed ‘discrimination based on the 
author’s gender and ethnicity in violation of article 26 of the Covenant.’68 While the 
Committee did not offer its own analysis of intersectional discrimination, its 
unreserved adoption of the pointed reasoning presented by the author is the first and 
only sign of an intersectionality-friendly stance in deciding an individual 
communication. The author’s pithy account of intersectional discrimination – viewing 
instances of discrimination as causally accruing on the basis of both sex and ethnicity 
and specifically in relation to Qom women and different from the experience of others 
who access the criminal justice system, especially Creole women – remains a worthy 
instance of learning how intersectionality is done right: by making space for the 
specific explanations of the nature of intersectional discrimination based on multiple 
grounds.   
 
3.2 Potential intersectional claims 
 
In contrast with communications which explicitly considered multiple grounds of 
discrimination together, there are over a dozen communications where 
intersectionality, though apparently visible, remained wholly uncultivated. This was 
despite of the fact that these were claims where several of the claimants’ identities 
seemed to be implicated in the way discrimination was suffered. While many of these 
claims succeeded anyway, six of them – all against the Netherlands – failed to impress 
in the absence of an intersectional analysis.  
 
A unifying theme amongst these decisions is the case of discrimination against 
unmarried women, economically dependent on social assistance or on their partners 
in cohabitation or marriage-like relationships. The patterns of disadvantage created by 
the interwoven grounds of gender/sex, marital status, and poverty/class/socio-
economic status/reliance on social status, seem to have been pressed neither by the 
authors nor examined by the Committee in its typically brief judgements. Danning v 
                                                 
67  LNP (n 23) [2.7].  
68  ibid [13.3].  
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the Netherlands,69 Sprenger v the Netherlands,70 Hoofdman v the Netherlands,71 and 
Derksen v the Netherlands,72 all failed without the appreciation of intersecting patterns 
of disadvantage based on multiple grounds. In Danning, the difference in treatment 
between married and unmarried couples in the distribution of disability benefits 
(where married couples received higher payment) was found not to be discriminatory 
under article 26. In Sprenger, the Committee upheld the limitation of co-insurance 
under the Health Insurance Act to spouses thereby denying the claim of a female 
cohabiting partner. Hoofdman denied the pension claim of an unemployed and 
dependent surviving partner who was not married to the deceased. Derksen confirmed 
the exclusion of unmarried female partners from claiming benefits because they were 
not married to their deceased partners.  
 
All the claims were singularly argued on the ground of marital status and their 
reasoning follows identical trajectory—of applying the test of ‘reasonable and 
objective criteria’ in judging whether the distinction was sustainable under article 26. 
The Committee consistently found the marital status distinction to be based on such 
criteria. Any effort to understand the disadvantage suffered by unmarried women 
(except in Hoofdman where the author was male), especially due to their economically 
weaker and dependent positions, remains eerily absent. The fact that these claims 
were not simply about the distinction between married and unmarried people but 
about specific claimants who suffered disadvantage because of their own complex set 
of circumstances – being female, unmarried, and economically dependent – found no 
inlet in the decisions spanning over two decades of the Committee’s discrimination 
work between 1984-2005.73  
 
What is more puzzling though is that there is little difference between this set of failed 
claims and the successful ones, given their obvious factual similarities. Ato del 
Avellanal v Peru,74 Pauger v Austria,75 Vos (AP Johannes) v the Netherlands,76 Young v 
Australia,77 and X v Colombia78  all considered claims by women or homosexual 
partners in marriage or marriage-like relationships. Ato del Avellanal concerned the 
denial of the right to sue for matrimonial property as a married woman. Pauger 
challenged the difference in scale of pension for widows versus widowers and Vos (AP 
                                                 
69  Danning v the Netherlands (1987) CCPR/C/OP/2/205/1990. 
70  Sprenger v the Netherlands (1992) CCPR/C/44/D/395/1990.  
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Veerman v the Netherlands (2005) CCPR/C/85/D/1238/2004.  
74  Ato del Avellanal v Peru (1988) CCPR/C/34/D/202/1988 
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Johannes) challenged the difference in scale of pension for married men versus 
married women. Young was about the denial of pension to same sex partners and X v 
Colombia about the denial of pension transfer to homosexual couples. The Committee 
found the distinctions in all these claims to be unsustainable, albeit on different 
grounds. While the Committee had found the distinctions between unmarried couples 
and married couples to be ‘reasonable and objective’ on the basis of marital status in 
Sprenger, Derksen and Hoofdman, it found the distinction between unmarried same-
sex couples and married couples unsustainable on the ground of sexual orientation in 
Young and X v Colombia. The difference lies in the fact that Young and X v Colombia 
succeeded because the Committee entered into – what the (joint) concurring opinion 
of Mrs. Ruth Wedgwood and Mr. Franco DePasquale in Young described as ‘a default 
judgement’, i.e. the claim succeeded in the absence of any evidence adduced by the 
States to show that the distinction between same-sex and heterosexual couples was 
‘reasonable and objective.’79 Similarly, in Ato del Avellanal, Pauger and Vos (AP 
Johannes), the Committee looked only at the authors’ gender but not marital status, 
and found violations based on the denial of equality between men and women which 
provided a one-size-fits-all explanation for sex discrimination in article 26. In 
substantive terms, what this means is that: whilst the sexual orientation of couples 
mattered in determining the legality of denial of benefits in marriage like relationships 
in Young and X v Colombia, and gender mattered in claims relating to benefits in 
marriage like Ato del Avellanal, Pauger and Vos (AP Johannes); gender and economic 
dependence of unmarried women did not factor in marital status discrimination claims 
like Sprenger and Derksen.  
 
There are no ready explanations for the Committee’s uneven handling of these 
complex discrimination claims which involve similar and several grounds of 
discrimination. Yet, what is apparent is the Committee’s single-ground focus which 
belies intersectionality, where it considers only one ground as causing discrimination. 
This single-mindedness fails to explain key differences between the results in claims of 
unmarried couples where the claimants were women versus where the claimants were 
same-sex partners. The choice of a single ground – marital status, gender or sexual 
orientation – made by the claimants seems to have been determinative in the 
classification and final determination of the claims. A final example of MT v 
Uzbekistan80 reveals the Committee’s preoccupation with single-ground discrimination 
aptly. The author, who was a human rights activist, was assaulted, beaten and 
harassed multiple times by the police and State authorities, including with baseless 
arrests and investigations into her human rights activities. She was subjected to 
solitary confinement, tortured and gang raped in prison. She was also operated against 
her will and her uterus was removed. As a result, she had difficulty walking, 
                                                 
79  Young (n 77) [10.4]; X v Colombia, ibid [7.2]. 
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significantly lost her eyesight, and suffered severe diabetes, depression, memory loss 
and anxiety. 81  The author argued that whilst all other treatment constituted 
discrimination on the basis of political opinion (because of her human rights 
campaigning), her gang rape and forced sterilisation was specifically a case of sex 
discrimination.82  The Committee agreed with this distinction and found for sex 
discrimination. In upholding the author’s contention, the Committee added: ‘the 
involuntary sterilization together with the rape committed against the author show 
the specific aggression against her as a woman.’83 The insistence on segregating the 
author’s identities for the purpose of determining violations lacks basis. Causally, the 
author could not have been targeted as a woman with sexual assault and involuntary 
sterilisation, if she had not possessed the political opinion she did and acted as a 
human rights activist. The two seem intertwined in that the treatment meted out to 
the author was not specifically either as a woman or as an activist but as both at the 
same time. The lack of appreciation of this connection led the Committee member 
Dheerujlall Seetulsingh to proclaim in dissent that the sexual assault and forced 
sterilisation had in fact nothing to do with sex discrimination at all and were rather the 
domain of torture based on political opinion. Whilst he completely missed the gender 
dimension; the Committee’s leading opinion missed the relevance of political opinion 
of the author as forming the basis of discriminatory treatment along with gender. In 
fact, the concurring opinion by Sarah Cleveland and Olivier de Frouville, also stressed 
on ‘the peculiarly gendered nature of her abuse…because she was a woman.’84 
 
The fastidious interest in segregating gender and gender-based crime from the effects 
of other enumerated grounds in article 26 like political opinion seems misguided, at 
least in causal or correlational terms for understanding why someone suffers 
discrimination at all. It is based on and reinforces the illusion that women either do not 
possess, or could not be targeted and raped for anything other than their sexuality 
especially not their political opinion. It basically thwarts intersectionality in its tracks by 
making all women’s discrimination claims primarily about their sex, and consequently, 
seeing other grounds like marital status and political opinion to have nothing to do 
with sex or gender.  
 
4. Fifty Years On and Beyond 
 
The question that arises in learning that intersectionality has fallen through the cracks 
of the Committee’s discrimination jurisprudence is why it matters to be reckoned with 
at all and how can this be realised. To wit, a claim may well succeed in terms of 
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obtaining the desired remedy under another right. For example, in the case of MT v 
Uzbekistan above, the net result of the Committee deciding on intersectionality via 
article 26 would have been the same as deciding on article 7 alone on the prohibition 
of torture. Further, even if such claims were instances of intersectionality ‘proper’, one 
may still ask why they cannot be substantially addressed via a single ground alone. For 
example, Broeks may have been a case of intersectional discrimination against married 
women based on marital status and gender both, but what was lost in addressing it 
basically as a matter of gender discrimination and finding in favour of the claimants? 
Even if one sees through the perspective of failed claims, a thorough single ground 
analysis of sex or marital status may have been sufficient in Sprenger, Danning and 
Derksen to match the successes in comparable claims like Avellanal, Pauger and Vos 
(AP Johannes). Viewed through the lens of results, intersectionality’s contribution may 
not be immediately apparent. Whilst its conceptual significance may not be lost upon 
claimants, their lawyers and the Committee members; its application in article 26 
claims may seem too cumbersome, cosmetic, and ultimately irrelevant to the final 
outcome of the claim.  
 
As this section hopes to show, this is a gross underestimation of the juridical 
significance of addressing intersectional discrimination in international law. 
Intersectionality matters in the way discrimination is examined and ultimately decided, 
such that genuine claims may not only succeed but their analyses look qualitatively 
different from an intersectionality-devoid perspective. The qualitative difference lies in 
addressing discrimination as more than just based on a single ground and looking at 
interactions between multiple grounds producing similar and different patterns of 
disadvantage which relates to redistribution, recognition, participation, and structural 
and systemic harms. Intersectional discrimination thus bids for complex forms of 
discrimination to be addressed in international law via mechanisms like the Human 
Rights Committee’s communications procedure under the First Optional Protocol.  
 
This bid may be limited by the Committee’s procedural mandate under the First 
Optional Protocol which may be stretched thin in supporting an intersectional analysis. 
Section 4.1 first shows that the Committee’s mandate, though agreeably restricted, is 
sufficiently malleable to allow complex cases of intersectional discrimination to be 
unravelled and responded to. Section 4.2 then considers the conceptual and doctrinal 
implications of responding to intersectional discrimination in article 26.   
 
4.1 Situating intersectional discrimination in international law  
 
The framework of international law procedures is vastly different from the domestic 
adjudicatory models of discrimination law. In the context of the individual 
communication procedure under the First Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, there are 
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limitations of international law applied by and applicable to the Committee’s work. 
Unlike national courts which have substantial leeway in regulating their own 
procedure, the Committee’s procedure is not only mandated but strictly so. It can 
accept only written submissions, has no direct investigative powers and no possibility 
of conducting an adversarial hearing which allows listening to and speaking with the 
parties in determining the complaint.85 Facts are established not in the way they 
normally are before regular courts but upon a reading of the parties’ materials alone. 
Independent research of the Committee and its members, if pursued, appears minimal 
in the absence of references in the decisions. The Committee thus does not act as a 
judicial body under the Optional Protocol and its decisions are not actually binding in 
law.86 The Committee in fact is not exclusively comprised of lawyers but 18 human 
rights experts.87 The adopted decisions, even though reflective of human rights law, do 
not mirror established legal practice, especially in terms of providing a structured and 
detailed discrimination analysis of the claim. The decisions remain characteristically 
terse, presented on a standard template, with the final section on ‘consideration of 
merits’ in each decision seldom exceeding a paragraph or two at most, with a simple 
note of agreement or disagreement with the parties. The concluding paragraph on 
remedies is kept general, directing the state party to provide an effective remedy and 
prevent similar violations occurring in the future. The directions do not target 
intersectional claimants and those in their position in order to ameliorate their specific 
conditions of disadvantage. 
 
The implications of this are visible in discrimination complaints, especially those of 
intersectional discrimination. In the absence of a culture of bringing and deciding 
intersectional claims, the facts and arguments on the subject remain thin. As seen in 
Section 3.2, even discrimination cases with obvious intersectional dimensions are not 
advanced as such. Given the lack of a possibility to intervene to clarify specific 
arguments on intersectional discrimination with the parties, the Committee has had to 
rely on what has been advanced in writing. Since the ICCPR and the Committee deal 
with a variety of rights, the Committee experts may also be limited in its capacity to 
explore specific ways of responding to intersectional discrimination in any other way.  
 
And yet despite these limitations, the Committee’s work under the Optional Protocol is 
considered, at least in practice, to be legal, judicial and binding. Since the ‘Optional 
Protocol decisions apply the ICCPR in concrete situations, [they] deliver the most 
specific interpretations of the Covenant.’88 The individual decisions ‘exhibit some 
important characteristics of a judicial decision…arrived at in a judicial spirit, including 
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the impartiality and independence of Committee members, the considered 
interpretation of the language of the Covenant, and the determinative character of the 
decisions.’ 89  The Committee is believed to have produced ‘a large body of 
jurisprudence touching on important aspects of most of the ICCPR… [and] has dealt 
with a large number of complicated issues, which have necessitated genuine findings 
of law.’90 Its decisions are therefore strong indicators of legal obligations under the 
ICCPR, which in turn is binding.91 The Committee has even instituted a ‘follow-up’ 
procedure taking stock of the state’s performance of obligations under the decisions.  
 
In this light, the Committee’s handling of intersectional claims appears lightweight and 
deliberately so. The endless struggle with the Netherlands on the single issue of 
unmarried partners or married women’s social benefits demonstrates how the 
Committee may have failed to intervene in a systematic manner to respond to 
established patterns of disadvantage suffered by the authors and those in their 
position.92 The responsibility, as clear from LNP, has rested primarily with the authors 
(and their lawyers) to advance their claim with as much clarity and detail as possible. 
This includes clarity over how multiple grounds produce similar and different patterns 
of disadvantage and detailing such patterns with specific instances which show the 
nature of multi-layered discrimination suffered by the intersectional claimant. This 
responsibility, though, must be fairly distributed in two ways. First, instead of rejecting 
the complexity of the bid at hand, intersectional discrimination may be yet another 
instance requiring the Committee to be proactive under individual communications 
procedure, just as it has been in recognising other key concepts like indirect 
discrimination and affirmative action, and expanding the list of grounds under article 
26 through its transformative jurisprudence.93 As the article has shown, part of the 
problem in recognising intersectional cases has been the self-imposed normative 
limitation of discrimination to be based on a single ground alone. The Committee is 
well placed in expanding the boundaries of discrimination by admitting the possibility 
of discrimination to be based on multiple grounds. Secondly, this recognition must be 
substantively backed by a clear and accessible approach to article 26 which goes 
beyond the ‘first generation’ single-ground model to one which is more responsive to 
complex and pressing forms of discrimination. This is because despite the de jure 
limitations, if decisions on article 26, including those potentially involving 
intersectionality, carry remarkable weight like the rest of the Committee’s 
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jurisprudence, they need to exude that weight internally from within. This involves a 
fundamental commitment to intersectionality and an appreciation of the substantive 
content of the right against discrimination in article 26. The next section considers this.  
 
4.2 Situating intersectional discrimination in article 26 
 
To remind, article 26 prohibits ‘discrimination on any ground.’ If one is allowed a 
semantic detour, it is useful to note that the verb form ‘on’ in this phrase links the fact 
of discrimination to listed grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. What it does is 
signify that discrimination is understood in terms of discriminatory criteria (direct 
discrimination) or discriminatory effects (indirect discrimination) based on grounds. 
This link, where the causation or correlation in the occurrence of discriminatory act or 
effects is centrally based on multiple grounds in a claim, is the kernel of intersectional 
discrimination under article 26. In fact, the grounds link between a discriminatory 
measure and its ensuing disadvantage is the kernel of ‘discrimination’ as such.94 
Discrimination is discrimination because of this link.  
 
But this causal or correlational link with grounds is exactly what has been missed by 
the Committee in the individual communications considered above, except in LNP. 
Take for example, the recurring case before the Committee where an unmarried 
woman is denied her deceased partner’s pension. The relevant authority may cite a 
variety of reasons for this: (i) it just does not have the money to approve any more 
pensions this year because of bankruptcy; (ii) it simply does not like the claimant; (iii) it 
does not give pensions to partners at all—whether married or not; (iv) it does not give 
pensions to women at all; (v) it does not give pensions to unmarried partners; (vi) it 
does not give pensions to unmarried partners but it leaves unmarried women worse 
off because they normally survive their male partners on whom they were 
economically dependent and have little choice in the decision of contracting a 
marriage. (i) and (ii) have nothing to do with ‘discrimination’ as defined above – 
because the actions and their effects are not based on any ground. (iii), too, may not 
have anything to do with grounds per se, unless it is shown that others in a similar 
position have been included and only partners/spouses are unfairly excluded on the 
basis of family status or such. In (iv), the prohibition does not distinguish between 
married and unmarried women but denies pension to all women per se. It is a case of 
direct sex discrimination proper. In the same vein, (v) is the case of direct marital 
status discrimination proper and this is how the Committee treated a host of similar 
cases – Danning, Sprenger, Derksen and Vos (Hendrika S). And in all of them, the article 
26 claim failed. The failure can be attributed to the lack of understanding and hence 
addressing the disadvantage specifically associated with the authors as unmarried 
                                                 
94  Tarunabh Khaitan, A Theory of Discrimination Law  (OUP 2015) 165–171.  
  21 
women, on the grounds of marital status and sex; thus approaching the claim as a 
matter of (vi) rather than (v). That is, as a case of intersectional impact on unmarried 
women who were specifically affected by the exclusion, which exacerbated their socio-
economic disadvantage as dependent female partners on the basis of both marital 
status and sex. The Committee may not have found that all unmarried or married 
persons, men and women, were disadvantaged by the exclusion from benefits 
associated with marriage. But it could have possibly found that claimants who were 
unmarried women were a special intersecting group between the groups of women 
and unmarried persons who suffered disadvantages specifically associated with their 
identities, including disadvantage relating to unequal power dynamics like the lack of 
choice in contracting marriage and economic dependence on male partners. 
Diagnostically speaking, their claims were thus based on both marital status and sex 
because of the distinct nature of disadvantage produced by the intersection of these 
grounds.   
 
What comes through in this explanation is that: the distinct nature of intersectional 
discrimination lies in similar and different patterns of group disadvantage based on 
multiple grounds because these patterns reveal the actual disadvantage at play. But it 
is important to acknowledge that, as a corollary, if intersectionality does not 
specifically help getting at this actual disadvantage, it may not be an appropriate 
framework for the claim. Thus, intersectionality may not be equally relevant or useful 
in all cases which may, analytically speaking, be better off being addressed as claims of 
single-ground discrimination. Amanda Jane Mellet v Ireland is a classic example this.95 
Mellet concerned a challenge to the Irish laws which permitted abortion only where 
the life of the pregnant woman was at risk, leaving at risk women with other difficult 
and unwanted pregnancies such as those carrying fetuses with severe abnormalities. 
The HRC in Mellet found a breach of article 26 on the basis of two grounds—socio-
economic condition and women who choose to terminate a non-viable pregnancy—
which lead to an overly narrow ruling relating to a small cross section of women rather 
than women generally who face widespread discrimination in accessing abortion in 
Ireland. The concurring opinions of Yadh Ben Achour and Sarah Cleveland, and the 
joint concurring opinion Víctor Rodríguez Rescia, Olivier de Frouville, and Fabián 
Salvioli argued that the decision should have rightly been seen as sex discrimination 
against women per se rather than just the claimant and those in her position. Their 
argument was that while the specific instance of violation itself related to the claimant 
who was not socio-economically well off to travel abroad for an abortion needed for 
her near-fatal pregnancy, the discrimination she suffered was based on stereotypes 
related to sex and thus not confined to just that sub-group of women but to all women 
who suffered under Ireland’s severely restrictive laws. In that sense, while 
intersectionality appeared to be facially relevant in this case, it was certainly not a case 
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of intersectional discrimination proper: that is, it was not causally, only based on a 
confluence or combination of grounds but one based squarely on sex.96 
 
Thus, the conceptual framework of intersectionality only matters in cases where 
intersectionality helps grasp the substantive understanding of what discrimination in 
particular cases actually looks like. It is this substantive content which goes 
unidentified and unaddressed when the conceptual framework is not applied. The 
normative and substantive dimensions of discrimination reinforce each other in this 
way. Whilst this article has dealt with the (absence of) intersectional framework at 
length in the previous sections, it is also useful to highlight that the appreciation of 
intersectional discrimination involves not just an appreciation of intersectionality but 
of the substantive content of discrimination itself in article 26.  
 
But the substantive understanding of discrimination remains rather underdeveloped in 
the Committee’s jurisprudence. While article 26 did not itself say what discrimination 
really was, ‘discrimination’ was later defined in General Comment No 18 as that ‘which 
has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.’97 The potential 
of this explanation remains untapped to date and completely overshadowed by the 
final proclamation in General Comment No 18: 
 
the Committee observes that not every differentiation of treatment will 
constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable 
and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under 
the Covenant.98 
 
The yardstick for measuring whether something is discriminatory has turned on the 
assessment of whether it is reasonable and objective rather than an impact analysis 
based on whether it impairs the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on 
an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. Arguably, there is a dramatic difference 
between the two. The consideration of what is actually reasonable and objective can 
be completely transformed if measured from the standpoint of impairment of equal 
recognition, enjoyment and exercise of all rights and freedoms.99 This, though, has not 
been the case. The focus has been on a general and vague standard of reasonable and 
objective without any correlation to the actual discriminatory impact on rights, the 
                                                 
96  See esp the discussion in Fiona de Londras, ‘Fatal Foetal Abnormality, Irish Constitutional Law, and 
Mellet v Ireland’ (2016) 24 Medical Law Review 591. 
97  General Comment 18 (n 10) [7]. 
98  ibid [13]. 
99  For a distinction between the two see Titia Loenen, ‘The Equality Clause in the South African 
Constitution: Some Remarks from a Comparative Perspective’ (1997) 13 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 401.  
  23 
point of bringing, and adjudicating upon, a discrimination claim at all. 100  The 
Committee has thus upheld impugned actions in intersectional cases like Schmitz-de-
Jong, Derksen, Hoofdman, Cavalcanti, Danning, Vos (Hendrika S) and Sprenger, 
because it considered the justifications offered by the Dutch government to be 
reasonable and objective. No real consideration of the actual ‘impairment’ of rights – 
social benefits granted under the national legislations – took place before launching 
into the question of whether such difference in treatment or impact could eventually 
be justified.101 By frontloading the justification inquiry and completely obliterating the 
consideration of the impact of discrimination on the equal enjoyment of rights, the 
Committee has foregone developing a richer understanding of discrimination, 
intersectional or otherwise.  
 
Coupled with this is the fact that ‘reasonable and objective’ is a rather low standard as 
compared to a higher standard of review like proportionality. Proportionality requires 
subjecting evidence to a multi-stage analysis of legitimacy, suitability, necessity and 
balancing;102 whilst reasonable and objective standard is a highly deferential standard, 
operating as no more than an approval of whatever the State offers as the reason for 
differentiation.103 Though the Committee has declared that discrimination on the basis 
of specific grounds enumerated in article 26, ‘places a heavy burden on the State party 
to explain the reason for the differentiation,’104 a higher standard of review in 
intersectional cases, even based on grounds explicitly listed in article 26, seems 
absent. Successful cases like MT and LNP applied no more than reasonable and 
objective standard for adjudicating the gravest of violations against women on the 
basis of their political opinion and ethnicity, respectively. But it was in unsuccessful 
cases with less obvious discriminatory actions (than sexual assault and forced 
sterilisation) like Derksen where a higher standard of scrutiny could weed out 
simplistic reasoning like extending ‘earlier decisions in which the Committee [had 
already] reviewed the Dutch social security legislation’ to conclude that the distinction 
between married and unmarried couples continued to survive as reasonable and 
objective even in the present claim.105 Why the Committee considered the distinction 
reasonable at all is left for anyone to speculate. But the fact that the thin standard of 
                                                 
100   Catherine Albertyn and Janet Kentridge, ‘Introducing the Right to Equality in the Interim 
Constitution’ (1994) 10 South African Journal on Human Rights 149, 175.  
101   Domestic courts have especially stressed on the importance of conducting impact analysis before 
pursuing justifications in discrimination claims. See Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) [51]–
[52] (Goldstone J); Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1999] 1 SCR 497 
(SCC) [81]. 
102  See for a detailed analysis of proportionality review Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional 
Rights and their Limitations (CUP 2012); Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of 
Review’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 174; Cora Chan, ‘Proportionality and Invariable Baseline 
Intensity of Review’ (2013) 33 Legal Studies 1. 
103  Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 182. 
104  Muller and Engelhard v Namibia (2002) CCPR/C/74/D/919/2000 [6.7].  
105  Derksen (n 72) [4.4] [9.2]. 
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reasonableness could be passed by most governmental policies without much or 
simply by citing previously decided communications, makes it particularly problematic 
in being adopted as the touchstone for judging intersectional cases, just as it is for 
single ground cases. Retreating to a focus on discrimination and its impact is vital in 
setting straight the record on intersectionality.  
 
It is useful to sum up. First, responding to the category of intersectional discrimination 
requires an appreciation of the framework of intersectionality—one based on multiple 
and intersecting grounds creating similar and different patterns of group disadvantage 
at the same time. Secondly, it is this framework which reveals the specific nature of 
intersectional disadvantage associated with the patterns. This disadvantage is complex 
and requires the Committee to step outside of its traditional mould of treating 
discrimination as a matter of reasonableness alone. Intersectional discrimination thus 
impinges on both the technical framework as well as the substantive content of 
discrimination under article 26.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Intersectionality remains largely wanting in the Human Rights Committee’s 
jurisprudence other than the single instance of LNP. In LNP, the Committee decided 
the article 26 claim on the grounds of sex and ethnicity, subjecting them to an 
intersectional analysis of finding similar and different patterns of group disadvantage 
based on both the grounds. The lack of this approach in other similar cases is largely 
reflective of the lack of an understanding of intersectionality: that it contributes to a 
different category of ‘intersectional discrimination’ which is based on more than one 
ground and has a different character than single-ground discrimination. In failing to 
see that such a form of discrimination exists and what it means lies the Committee’s 
basic error which is conceptual in nature. But the breakthrough in LNP provides the 
HRC a cue for transforming its record on the subject. The key to unlocking this 
potential remains in consistently looking for and appreciating both the nature of 
intersectionality and the purpose of prohibiting discrimination in a substantive way. 
Amongst other things, the legacy beyond the first fifty years of the ICCPR will be 
shaped by how the HRC responds to this challenge in order to address complex and 
crosscutting forms of discrimination.  
 
 
